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ABSTRACT
NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION UNDER
PREDONATION
AKYOL, Ethem
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
July 2008
We consider two person bargaining problems under predonation. Before the
bargaining solution is applied we allow the alteration of the bargaining set by
means of pre-donations of a share in one’s would-be payoffs to one’s opponent.
Thus, a pre-bargain stage is instituted in which the bargainers may manipu-
late, via pre-donations, the (Nash) bargaining solution as applied in the next
stage.We firstly concentrate on the simple bargaining problems with bargain-
ing sets that have linear pareto frontier and show that the stronger bargainer
(with greater ideal payoff) giving a pre-donation, her best pre-donation trans-
forming the bargaining set into one on which the Nash bargaining solution
distributes payoffs so that while other bargainer gets exactly the same payoff
(as applied to the original simple bargaining problem), stronger bargainer
makes strictly better off. Then, we look for Stackelberg and Nash equilibria
of the so called ”predonation game”. Furthermore, we list our results for two
by two normal form games.
Keywords: Bargaining, Nash Bargaining Solution,Predonation .
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O¨ZET
O¨NDEN BAG˘IS¸ ALTINDA NASH PAZARLIK
C¸O¨ZU¨MU¨
AKYOL, Ethem
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Temmuz 2008
O¨nden bag˘ıs¸ altında iki kis¸ilik pazarlık problemlerini du¨s¸u¨nu¨yoruz. Pazarlık
c¸o¨zu¨mu¨ uygulanmadan o¨nce, pazarlık ku¨mesinin birinin gelecekteki
faydasının dig˘erine o¨nden bag˘ıs¸ yo¨ntemiyle deg˘is¸mesine izin veriyoruz.
Dolayısıyla,pazarlıkc¸ıların o¨nden bag˘ıs¸ yo¨ntemiyle bir sonraki as¸amada
uygulanan (Nash) pazarlık c¸o¨zu¨mu¨nu¨ deg˘is¸tirebileceg˘i o¨n-pazarlık as¸aması
kuruluyor. O¨ncelikle dog˘rusal pareto cephesine sahip basit pazarlık ku¨meleri
u¨zerinde yog˘unlas¸ıyoruz ve gu¨c¸lu¨ oyuncu ( daha yu¨ksek ideal noktaya sahip)
o¨nden bag˘ıs¸ verip en iyi o¨nden bag˘ıs¸ı pazarlık ku¨mesini Nash pazarlık
c¸o¨zu¨mu¨ faydaları dig˘er pazarlıkc¸ı aynı faydayı alırken ( asıl basit pazarlık
problemine uygulandıg˘ıyla) gu¨c¸lu¨ oyuncunun daha iyi duruma gelecek
s¸ekilde dag˘ıtıyor. Daha sonra, “o¨nden bag˘ıs¸ oyunun” Stackelberg ve Nash
dengelerini aras¸tırıyoruz. Bununla beraber, ikiye iki normal form oyunlar
ic¸in sonuc¸larımızı listeliyoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Pazarlık, Nash Pazarlık C¸o¨zu¨mu¨, O¨nden Bag˘ıs¸.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the simplest yet most fruitful paradigms in cooperative game theory
is the ”bargaining problem”, in which a group of two or more participants is
faced with a set of feasible outcomes, any of which will be the result if it is
specified by the unanimous agreement of all the participants. If there is no
unanimous agreement, a predetermined disagreement outcome (or, sometimes
called status-quo outcome) will be the result. If there are feasible outcomes
which all the participants prefer to the disagreement outcome, then there is
an incentive to reach an agreement; however,so long as at least two of the
participants differ over which outcome is the most preferable, there is a need
for bargaining and negotiation over which outcome should be chosen.
We will look at history of bargaining problems. We will follow Roberto
Serrano’s study which can be found in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics (see Bibliography) here in brief. Before the adoption of game theo-
retic techniques, bargaining problems (also called bilateral monopolies at the
time) were deemed indeterminate by economics. This was certainly the posi-
tion stated by important economic theorists, including Edgeworth (1881) and
Hicks (1932). More specifically, it was believed that the solution to a bargain-
ing problem must satisfy both individual rationality and collective rationality
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properties: the former means that neither party should end up worse than at
the status-quo and the latter refers to Pareto efficiency. Typically, the set of
individually rational and Pareto efficient agreements is very large in a bar-
gaining problem, and these theorists were inclined to think that theoretical
arguments could not go further than this in getting a prediction. To be able to
obtain such a prediction, one would have to rely on extra-economic variables,
such as the bargaining power and abilities of either party, the psychological
state of mind in negotiations, the religious beliefs of each party, the weather,
and so on. A precursor to the game theoretic study of bargaining, at least
in the attempt to provide a more determinate prediction, is the analysis of
Zeuthen (1930). This Danish economist formulated a principle by which the
solution to a bargaining problem be dictated by the two parties’ risk attitudes
(given the probability of breakdown of negotiations following the adoption of
a tough position at the bargaining table).
Nash (1950, 1953) are two seminal papers that constitute the birth of the
axiomatic theory of bargaining. Two assumptions are central in Nash’s the-
ory. First, bargainers are assumed to be fully rational individuals, and the
theory is intended to yield predictions based exclusively on data relevant to
them. Second, a bargaining problem is represented as a pair (S, d) where S is
a compact and convex subset of R2, the feasible set of utilities and d ∈ S is the
disagreement utility point. Compactness follows from standard assumptions
such as closed productions sets and bounded factor endowments, and con-
vexity is obtained if one uses expected utility and lotteries over outcomes are
allowed. Also, the set S must include points that dominate the disagreement
point, i.e., there is a positive surplus to be enjoyed if agreement is reached and
the question is how this surplus should be divided. As in most of game theory,
by utility we mean von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility; there may be
underlying uncertainty, perhaps related to the probability of breakdown of
negotiations.
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With this second assumption, Nash is implying that all relevant informa-
tion to the solution of the problem must be subsumed in the pair (S, d). In
other words, two bargaining situations that may include distinct details ought
to be solved the same way if both reduce to the same pair (S, d) in utility
terms. In spite of this, it is sometimes convenient to distinguish between
feasible utility pairs (points in S) from feasible outcomes in physical terms
(such as the splits of a pie, to be created after agreement).
There, Nash introduced an idealized representation of the two-person bar-
gaining problem and developed a methodology that gave hope to resolve
undeterminateness of the terms of the bargaining that had been noted by
Edgeworth (1881). After Nash’s works there have been many applauds but
his studies received also many criticsm. Many economists argue the fairness
of Nash Bargaining solution and many other bargaining solutions have been
proposed. This is due to the fact that no solution can be universally accept-
able. The question which solution is better or fair is a question that can not
be answered the same way by all people. This led many different bargaining
solutions and studies on these solutions.
One of these studies is due to pioneering work of Murat Sertel on manipu-
lability of well known bargaining solutions via predonations. He argued that
no legal obstacle can stop agents from signing contracts under which they
would be better off, thus far-sighted players, having the chance to change
the bargaining set at hand by ”predonating” share of their would-be payoffs,
would reach to a better point. He studied on simple bargaining problems with
disagreement point at the origin. His joint work with B.Zeki Orbay showed
that Nash Bargaining solution is manipulable when applied to simple bar-
gaining sets. Afterwards, Orbay(2000) showed that Kalai-Smorodinsky and
Maschler-Perles Solutions give exactly the same solution under pre-donation
when applied to simple bargaining problems. In addition to these studies,
Akin(2001) showed that Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can be manipulated via
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predonation and the solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.
The common point in these studies is that it is assumed that only one player
makes predonation.
In this study we will examine predonation firstly on simple bargaining
problems as in the previous works. Contrary to previous works, we will con-
sider the cases where both player can make predonation. This will constitute
Chapter 3. Then, in Chapter 4, we will investigate predonation going be-
yond simple bargaining problems. We will consider two by two normal form
games with certain assumptions and our aim will be to determine whether
players can make better off via predonation in these games. Final part will
be the conclusion. Before these, in Chapter 2, we will introduce the formal
treatment of bargaining and basic terminology that will be used throughout.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Formal Treatment of Bargaining
In this section, we will introduce the formal characterization of bargaining
problems and give basic terminology to the reader.
Definition. We define a two person bargaining problem by a pair (S, d) where
S is a compact, convex subset of R2, and d = (d1, d2) ∈ S.
Remark 1. It is generally required that there is an element s = (s1, s2) ∈ S
such that si > di to make sure that players have an incentive to bargain and
we will assume this throughout.
Definition. Let B be the class of all bargaining problems. We mean by a
bargaining solution a function that assigns a unique member of S to every
bargaining problem (S, d) ∈ B.
2.1.1 Nash’s Axiomatic Characterization
Nash, in his seminal work, listed the properties, or axioms, that he thought
the solution should satisfy, and he established that there is a unique bargain-
ing solution that satisfies these axioms. Now, we will list some axioms or
5
properties that will be used throughout and state the Nash’s theorem and its
proof.
- IAT (Independence of affine transformations): The bargaining
solution f is independent of affine transformations, if for any α = (α1, α2) ∈
R2 and for any β = (β1, β2) ∈ R2, where βi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
fi(S
′
, d
′
) = βif(S, d) + αi
, where S ′ = {(β1s1 + α1, β2s2 + α2) : (s1, s2) ∈ S}
If we accept preferences, not utilities, as basic, then the two bargaining
problems (S, d) and (S
′
, d
′
) represent the same situation. If the utility func-
tions ui ∈ {1, 2} generate the set S when applied to agreement set, say A,
then u
′
i = βiui + αi generate the set S
′
when applied to the same agreement
set A.Thus, the outcome predicted by the bargaining solution should be same
for (S, d) as for (S
′
, d
′
). Thus, the utility outcomes should be related in such
a way that fi(S
′
, d
′
) = βifi(S, d) + αi for i ∈ {1, 2}. In brief, the axiom re-
quires that the utility outcome of bargaining co-vary with the representation
of preferences, so that any physical outcome that corresponds to the solution
of the problem (S, d) also corresponds to the solution of (S
′
, d
′
).
- PAR (Pareto Optimality): A bargaining solution f satisfies PAR, if
for any S, there is no s ∈ S such that si > fi(S, d) for every i.
This requires that the players never agree on an outcome s when there is
an available outcome in which they are both better off. If they agreed on the
inferior outcome s, then there would be room for “renegotiation”: they could
continue bargaining, the pair of utilities in the event of disagreement point
being s.
-IIA(Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives): A bargaining so-
lution f satisfies IIA if, whenever S
′ ⊂ S and f(S, d) ∈ S ′ ,then f(S, d) =
f(S
′
, d).
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In other words, suppose that when all the alternatives in S are available,
the players agree on an outcome s in the smaller set S
′
. Then we require that
the players agree on the same outcome s when only the alternatives in S
′
are
available. The idea is that in agreeing on s when they could have chosen any
point in S, the players have discarded as “irrelevant” all the outcomes in S
other than s. Consequently, when they are restricted to the smaller set S
′
they should also agree on s: the solution should not depend on “irrelevant”
alternatives.
Note that this axiom makes the bargaining problems (S, d) and (S ′, d)
where S ′ = {(s1, s2) ∈ S : (d1, d2) ≤ (s1, s2)} same.
- SYM(Symmetry): We say that a bargaining problem (S, d) is sym-
metric if the following two properties hold:
i) If (s1, s2) ∈ S,then we have (s2, s1) ∈ S.
ii) d1 = d2.
The bargaining solution f satisfies SYM if f1(S, d) = f2(S, d) for any
symmetric bargaining problem (S, d).
With Nash’ s own words, this axiom states equality of bargaining skills of
bargainers. If the positions of the two bargainers completely symmetric, then
the solution should treat them symmetrically.
- IR(Individual Rationality): A bargaining solution f satisfies IR, if
f(S, d) > d for every bargaining problem (S, d).
This property is implicit in our treatment of bargaining. Many modern
treatments of the subject explicitly include this property.
Now, we are ready to state Nash’s theorem and its proof (We will follow
the proof of this theorem from Osborne,M.J. and Rubinstein,A., A course in
game theory (MIT Press, 1994)):
Theorem 1. There is a unique bargaining solution f : B → S satisfying the
axioms IAT,PAR,IIA and SYM, and it is given by
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fN(S, d) = arg max
(d1,d2)≤(s1,s2)∈S
(s1 − d1).(s2 − d2)
Proof. Firstly, we will show that fN is a well defined bargaining solution.
The set {s ∈ S : s > d} is a compact set and the function H defined by
H(s1, s2) = (s1 − d1).(s2 − d2)
is continuous, hence there is a solution to the maximization problem defining
fN . Furthermore, H is strictly quasi-concave on {s ∈ S : s > d}, and there
exist s ∈ S such that s > d, and S is convex, the maximizer is unique. Next,
let’s check that fN satisfies the stated axioms:
IAT: If (S, d) and (S
′
, d
′
) are as in the statement of the axiom, then
s
′ ∈ S ′ if and only if there is s ∈ S such that s′i = αi + βisi for i = 1, 2.Now,
(s
′
1 − d
′
1)(s
′
2 − d′2) = β1β2(s1 − d1)(s2 − d2)
Thus, (s∗1, s
∗
2) maximizes (s1 − d1)(s2 − d2) over S iff (α1 + β1s∗1, α2 + β2s∗2)
maximizes (s
′
1 − d′1)(s′2 − d′2) over S ′ .
PAR: Since H is increasing in each of its arguments, s does not maximize
H over S if there exists t ∈ S with ti > si for i = 1, 2.
IIA: If S
′ ⊂ S and s∗ ∈ S ′ maximizes H over S, then s∗ also maximizes
H over S
′
.
SYM: If (S, d) is symmetric and (s∗1, s
∗
2) maximizes H over S, then, since H
is a symmetric function, (s∗2, s
∗
1) also maximizes H over S. Since the maximizer
is unique, we have s∗1 = s
∗
2.
Final part will be the uniquess part. Suppose that f is a bargaining
solution that satisfies the four axioms. We will show that f = fN , that is
f(S, d) = fN(S, d) for any bargaining problem (S, d). Let fN(S, d) = z. Since
there exist si > di for i = 1, 2, we have zi > di for i = 1, 2.Let (S
′
, d
′
) be a
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bargaining problem that is obtained from (S, d) by the transformation si →
βisi + αi, where αi =
−di
2(zi−di) and βi =
1
2(zi−di) which moves the disagreement
point to the origin and the solution to (1
2
, 1
2
). Since both f and fN satisfies
IAT, we have for any i=1,2
fi(S
′
, 0) = βif(S, d) + αi
and
fNi (S
′
, 0) = βif
N(S, d) + αi
Hence, f(S, d) = fN(S, d) iff f(S
′
, 0) = fN(S
′
, 0). Since fN(S
′
, 0) = (1
2
, 1
2
), it
remains to show that f(S
′
, 0) = (1
2
, 1
2
).
We claim that S
′
contains no points (s
′
1, s
′
2) such that s
′
1+s
′
2 > 1. Suppose
not, i.e. let (s
′
1, s
′
2) ∈ S ′ such that s′1 + s′2 > 1, then let (t1, t2) = (1−2 +
s
′
1,
1−
2
+ s
′
2), where 0 <  < 1. Since S
′
is convex, the point (t1, t2) is in
S
′
; but for small enough , we have t1t2 >
1
4
, contradicting the fact that
fN(S
′
, 0) = (1
2
, 1
2
).
Since S
′
is bounded, then we can find a rectangle T about the 45o line
that contains S
′
, on the boundary of which is (1
2
, 1
2
). Now, by PAR and SYM,
we have f(T, 0) = (1
2
, 1
2
). By IIA, f(S
′
, 0) = f(T, 0), so that f(S
′
, 0) = (1
2
, 1
2
),
completing the proof.
2.1.2 Other Bargaining Solutions
After Nash’s work, many other bargaining solutions were proposed. We will
present some examples here:
1. The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution:fK(S, d) is the maximal point of
S on the segment connecting d to a(S, d) where
ai(S, d) = max {xi : x ∈ S, x > d} for all i ∈ {1, 2}
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2. Utilitarian Solution: fU(S, d) is a maximizer in s ∈ S of ∑ si.
3. Egalitarian Solution: fE(S, d) is the maximal point of S of equal
coordinates:
fE1 (S, d)− d1 = fE2 (S, d)− d2
4. Asymmetric Nash Solution:
fAN(S, d) = arg max
(d1,d2)≤(s1,s2)∈S
(s1 − d1)α.(s2 − d2)β
,where α, β > 0
5. Maschler-Perles Solution: fMP (S, d) is the point p which satisfies
p∫
k
√
−ds1ds2 =
t∫
p
√
−ds1ds2
where the line integrals are taken on the pareto frontier of S and k =
(d1, a2(S, d)) and t = (a1(S, d), d2), where
ai(S, d) = max {xi : x ∈ S, x > d} for all i ∈ {1, 2}
2.2 Normal Form Games
Definition. We call an ordered triple g = (N,X, u) an N normal form
game, where N is a nonempty set (set of players), X =
∏
i∈N
Xi where Xi
is a nonempty set for each i ∈ N and u = (ui)i∈N with ui : X → R, a
function for each i ∈ N . We will denote a two person normal form game by
g = (X, Y, u1, u2) where X = X1 and Y = X2.
Definition. Given a game g = (X, Y, u1, u2), γ ∈ X x Y is called a Nash
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Equilibrium if
For each i ∈ {1, 2} , for each x1 ∈ X, x2 ∈ Y, ui(γ) > ui(xi, γ−i)
Definition. Let g = (X, Y, u1, u2) be a finite two person normal form game
with |X| = m, |Y | = n, represent (u1, u2) by a bimatrix
(A,B) =

(a11, b11) . . (a1n, b1n)
. . . .
. . . .
(am1, bm1) . . (amn, bmn)

We define the mixed extension g
′
= (X
′
, Y
′
, u
′
1, u
′
2) by
X
′
= {x ∈ Rm+ :
m∑
i=1
xi = 1}
Y
′
= {y ∈ Rn+ :
n∑
i=1
yi = 1}
and for any x ∈ X ′ , y ∈ Y ′
u
′
1 = xAy
t
u
′
2 = xBy
t
Theorem 2. Let g = (X, Y, u1, u2) be a finite two person normal form game
with a bimatrix (A,B).Let g
′
= (X
′
, Y
′
, u
′
1, u
′
2) stand for the mixed extension
of g. Now, g
′
has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Any game theory book can be consulted for the proof.
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CHAPTER 3
SIMPLE BARGAINING PROBLEMS
UNDER PREDONATION
3.1 Unilateral Predonation
Sertel (1991) formally defined a simple bargaining problem as (Sa, d) where
Sa = {(u1, u2) ∈ R2+ : u1 6 a(1− u2)}
with d = (0, 0) and 0 < a < 1. Note that the ideal(maximal) payoff of Player
1 is a, and the ideal payoff of Player 2 is 1. We will sometimes call Player 2
richer or stronger player due to this fact.
Following Sertel(1991), we can interpret this problem as a property di-
vision problem as follows. We assume that there is a certain item property
which can be monetarily valued. Claimants have different valuations on the
property. The problem distributes 1, the highest claimed value, among the
claimants. If the property is divisible, we can distribute it to agents. If not, we
can give it to one of the claimants and require her to monetarily compensate
the others.
In our model, it is assumed that there is no legal prohibition for monetary
12
transfers but transfers are not considered as part of the bargaining stage
but are confined to the pre-bargaining stage, where a player gives a share
of her future payoffs to the other party before they bargain, which we call
”predonation” .
Before going further, let us explain formally what we mean by predonation:
Definition. Given a bargaining problem (S, d), by a predonation from agent
i to agent j we mean any function λi : S → R2, parametrized by some λi ∈
[0, 1], which transforms each (ui, uj) ∈ S into λi(ui, uj) = ((1−λi)ui, uj+λiui).
After defining what we mean by predonation, let’ s check whether predo-
nation is beneficial for bargainers in simple bargaining problem:
Now, simple calculations show that
fN(Sa, d) = (
a
2
,
1
2
)
We will firstly determine whether players can make better off by unilateral
predonations:
Consider firstly the case where Player 2 makes predonation, i.e. she do-
nates a portion of her would-be payoff to player 1, say λ ∈ [0, 1] of her payoff.
That means we make the following transformation:
(u1, u2)→ (u1 + λu2, (1− λ)u2)
Thus, given λ, our new bargaining set is:
S ′a(λ) = {(u
′
1, u
′
2) ∈ R2 : (u
′
1, u
′
2) = (u1+λu2, (1−λ)u2) for some (u1, u2) ∈ S}
Note that disagreement point (0, 0) is transformed to (0, 0).
Now, Player 2 will choose optimal λ that makes her payoff maximal when
Nash Bargaining solution is applied to (S ′a(λ), (0, 0)).Calculations show that
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(see Appendix A) λ∗2 =
a
2
, thus yielding a solution
(
a
2
, 1− a
2
)
Note that while Player 1 gets exactly the same payoff as he gets before
predonation, Player 2 becomes strictly better off.
Here, very obvious question to arise is whether this Nash Bargaining
solution is a solution of some well known bargaining solutions of the orig-
inal (before predonation) bargaining problem. The difficulty here arises
since we can not guarantee that new solution stays in non-predonated bar-
gaining set. However, it is obvious that the new solution will stay in
S
′
= {(u1, u2) ∈ R2+ : u1 + u2 6 1}. This bargaining set has another feature:
It is the bargaining set when we assume existence of transferable utility. Now,
it is very easy to see that asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution with weights
a
2
and 1− a
2
gives the result (a
2
, 1− a
2
) when applied to the bargaining problem
(S
′
, 0). Furthermore, we have the following result :
Theorem 3. Let A = {(u1, u2) ∈ R2+ : u1+u2 6 1}. For any a2 ∈ (0, 1), there
is a unique bargaining solution f
a
2 that satisfies IAT, IIA, IR, and f
a
2 (A, 0) =
(a
2
, 1− a
2
) and it is:
f
a
2 (S, d) = arg max
(d1,d2)≤(s1,s2)∈S
(s1 − d1)a2 .(s2 − d2)1−a2
Proof. The proof is very similar to proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to show
that f
a
2 satisfies the given axioms and f
a
2 (A, 0) = (a
2
, 1 − a
2
). Assume that
f is a bargaining solution that satisfies the four axioms. We will show that
f = fN , that is f(S, d) = fN(S, d) for any bargaining problem (S, d). Let
fN(S, d) = z. Since there exist si > di for i = 1, 2, we have zi > di for
i = 1, 2.Let (S
′
, d
′
) be a bargaining problem that is obtained from (S, d) by
the transformation si → βisi + αi, where α1 = −ad12(z1−d1) , β1 = a2(z1−d1) and
α2 =
−(1−a
2
)d2
2(z2−d2) , β2 =
(1−a
2
)
(z2−d2)which moves the disagreement point to the origin
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and the solution to (a
2
, 1− a
2
). Since both f and fN satisfies IAT, we have
fi(S
′
, 0) = βif(S, d) + αi for i = 1, 2
and
fNi (S
′
, 0) = βif
N(S, d) + αi for i = 1, 2
Hence, f(S, d) = f
a
2 (S, d) iff f(S
′
, 0) = f
a
2 (S
′
, 0). Since f
a
2 (S
′
, 0) = f(S
′
, 0) =
(a
2
, 1− a
2
), we have the result.
After stating our result for the case where Player 2 makes pre-donation,
we will now check whether Player 1 can benefit from unilateral predonation
of himself. As shown again in Appendix A, Player 1, poorer or weaker player,
can not become strictly better off via unilateral pre-donation. That is, λ∗1 = 0.
Thus, we have proved the following result:
Theorem 4. Given a simple bargaining problem (Sa, d), stronger player be-
comes strictly better off via unilateral predonation of herself without hurting
the weaker player. On the other hand, weaker player has no incentive to
predonate.
3.2 Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria
In previous section, we showed that although weaker player can not gain
from predonation, richer player becomes better off without hurting the other
player. That is, unilateral predonation leads to more efficient result. At this
point, we will find Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria of the predonation game
where both players announces a predonation share. Let’s firstly find the best
responses of bargainers to the predonation of other bargainer and we will
check whether players can benefit from responding to the predonation offer
of the other player.
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As shown in Appendix A,
BR1(λ2) = 0 ∀λ2 ∈ [0, 1]
and
BR2(λ1) =
a(1− λ1)
2(1− aλ1) ∀λ1 ∈ [0, 1]
Given these, we have the following result:
Theorem 5. Given a simple bargaining problem (Sa, d), the Stackelberg Equi-
libria when either Player 1 or Player 2 is the leader and Nash Equilibrium
yield payoff pair (a
2
, 1− a
2
).
Proof. Firstly, let’s check the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game where
Player 1 is the leader. In that case, Player 1, knowing the best response
of player 2, will announce λ1 and then Player 2 will announce λ2. As shown
in Appendix A, λ∗1 = 0 and λ
∗
2 =
a
2
, thus yielding Nash Bargaining solution
(a
2
, 1− a
2
).
Similarly, the Stackelberg game where Player 2 is the leader yields the
same solution since player 2 will choose λ∗2 =
a
2
since λ∗1 = 0. Furthermore, if
players simultaneously choose a predonation share, we find that Nash Equi-
librium is unique and it is (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = (0,
a
2
), yielding the same solution.
It is easy to see that the unique Nash equilibrium is (λ1, λ2) = (0,
a
2
)
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CHAPTER 4
TWO BY TWO NORMAL FORM GAMES
UNDER PREDONATION
In Chapter 3, we considered simple bargaining problems. Next, we will con-
sider two by two normal form games and will check whether players can
become better off via predonation. Namely , we will consider two person
normal form games with bimatrix
(A,B) =
(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)

Given this two person normal form game, the set of all obtainable payoff
pairs is just the convex hull of the four points. Call this set S. We will assume
that aij > 0 to make sure that players can predonate share of their payoffs.
That is, we do not allow players predonate more than they have. Further-
more, we will assume that mixed extension of this game has a unique Nash
Equilibrium. ( Note that we know existence of at least one Nash Equilib-
rium.) We will take the payoff pair that this Nash Equilibrium yields as the
disagreement point. That is, they get the non-cooperative equilibrium result
if they can not cooperate. This seems plausible considering that players can
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not commit themselves to any planned strategies in the event of disagree-
ment. Now, we have a well defined bargaining problem (S, d). Now, since
Nash Bargaining solution satisfies IIA, we can take the bargaining set to be
S ′ = {(s1, s2) ∈ S : (d1, d2) ≤ (s1, s2)}
and since Nash Bargaining solution satisfies IAT, we can transfom disagree-
ment point to the origin. Furthermore, noting that Nash Bargaining solution
satisfies PAR we can represent all such bargaining problems with one of the
seven bargaining problems with following bargaining sets. (Note also that
we will disregard the case where there is a unique pareto optimal point in
the bargaining set since it is trivially true that no player can benefit from
predonation.)
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By investigating each case seperately, we have the following result:
Theorem 6. Player 1 and Player 2 can become better off via unilateral pre-
donation under some conditions on the slopes of the lines that determines the
bargaining set.
Proof. We can transform the bargaining set such that ideal point of Player
2 is 1 and ideal point of Player 1 is a and the disagreement point is at the
origin since Nash Bargaining solution satisfies IAT and IIA.
Now, here we will state the results and leave calculations to Appendix B.
The first bargaining set is the simple bargaining set when a < 1 which we
discussed in previous chapter. The cases when a = 1 and a > 1 are considered
in Appendix B and we showed that while stronger player can become better
off via predonation, weaker player can not make better off. Other cases are
as follows:
Player 2 becomes better off if a
2
> b and a− b < 1.
Player 1 becomes better off if a > 2b and (a− b) > 1
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Player 2 becomes better off via predonation if (b < 1, b > 2a, a
b
> b
2
) or
(b < 1, b ≤ 2a).
Player 1 becomes better off if b ≤ 2a and b > 1
Player 2 becomes better off if
(2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a, a < b)
or
(a >
c
2
, b(2a− c) < a, c(2− b) > a), b > a
or
(a >
c
2
, b > a
2a− c, c < 1)
Player 1 becomes better off if
(2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a, a > b)
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or
(a >
c
2
, b(2a− c) < a, c(2− b) > a, b < a)
or
(a >
c
2
, b > a
2a− c, c > 1)
Player 2 becomes better off if
(b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a, c
2
− b > 1 and a < e)
or
(b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a, c
2
− b < 1 and a < e and a ≤ e(a− b))
or
(b <
c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac, c− b < 1)
Player 1 becomes better off if
b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a,a > e
or
b <
c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac, (c− b) > 1
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Player 2 becomes better off if Player 2 makes better off if [ b
2
< a, (2−d)c >
b, d > b], or [ b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d, c < 1] .
Player 1 becomes better off if
b
2
< a, (2− d)c > b, b > d
or
b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d, c > 1
Player 2 becomes better off via predonation if
[2c ≤ e, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c] or
[2c ≤ e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c)] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b > c, e < 1] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c)]
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Player 1 becomes better off via predonation if
[2c ≤ e, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a > d] or
[2c ≤ e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c), b < c] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a > d] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c), b < c]
Note that conditions that Player 1 becomes better off and conditions that
Player 2 becomes better off do not coincide.
Theorem 7. In each case, the Stackelberg Equilibria when either Player 1
or Player 2 is the leader and Nash Equilibrium yield the same payoff pair
as the player that can become better off by unilateral predonation of himself
unilaterally chooses optimal predonation share.
Proof. All the calculations are shown in Appendix B, again.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this study, we have dealt with bargaining problems under predonation.
Firstly, as in previous studies on bargaining under predonation, we consid-
ered simple bargaining problems that can be viewed as a division problem.
We extended results of previous studies on simple bargaining problems. We
have stated a result that links Nash Bargaining solution with Asymmetric
Nash Bargaining Solution. In addition, we not only considered the case of
unilateral predonation of players but also considered the case where a player
can respond to other player’s predonation. We showed that weaker player
always responds by ” not predonating ” to any predonation from the stronger
player, and we showed that stronger player has a unique best response to
any given predonation from weaker player. Using these results, we showed
that Stackelberg equilibria where Player 1 or Player 2 leader and the Nash
Equilibrium of the simultaneous game yield the same result.
Then, we considered two by two normal form games with unique Nash
Equilibrium. We take these games as a bargaining problem with bargaining
set which consists of all attainable utility pairs by cooperation of players and
the disagreement point to be the utility pair that the unique Nash Equilibrium
yields. We showed that, under some conditions both players can gain from
24
unilateral predonation. However, conditions where Player 1 and Player 2
becomes better off are different. That is, under conditions when Player 1
can become better off via unilateral predonation of himself Player 2 can not
become better off. Similarly, when Player 2 becomes better off via unilateral
predonation of herself Player 1 can not become better off via predonation of
himself. We, furthermore, checked the Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria and
saw that all equilibria yield the same payoff pair to bargainers.
In this study, we have seen that although stronger player always become
better off via predonation in simple bargaining problems and weaker player
can not become better off via unilateral predonation of himself, we can not
generalize this statement to any bargaining problem. That is, there are bar-
gaining problems that stronger player can not become better off via prado-
nation and there are problems that weaker player can become better off.
We have listed bargaining problems that arise from two by two normal form
games where each player can become better off.
Given these, it is still an open question whether we can generalize these
results to any bargaining problem. That is, to get general results about the
cases in which stronger player can become better off via predonation. It would
be next step to find conditions on any given bargaining problem that stronger
and weaker players become better off.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATIONS IN CHAPTER 3
A.1 Unilateral Pre-Donation
Consider firstly the case where Player 2 makes predonation, i.e. she donates
a portion of her would-be payoff to player 1, say λ ∈ [0, 1] of her payoff. Now,
when 0 < λ < a, we have the following bargaining set:
Note that when λ > a, there is a unique pareto optimal point (λ, 1− λ).We
know that Nash Bargaining solution will be a Pareto Optimal point.Thus,
Nash Bargaining solution is the point where u1u2 is maximized on the line
on the right.Thus, we will solve the following problem on the pareto optimal
line:
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max u1u2
= max u21(
λ− 1
a− λ)− u1(
λ− 1
a− λ)a
Now, ∂(u1u2)
∂u1
= 2(λ−1)
a−λ u1 − (λ−1)a−λ a. Thus,
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 iff u1 <
a
2
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 iff u1 >
a
2
Then, if player 2 chooses λ < a
2
, NBS(Nash Bargaining Solution) will yield
a
2
. 1−λ
a−λ to Player 2, which is increasing in λ; if player 2 chooses λ =
a
2
, NBS
will yield 1 − a
2
to Player 2 . If player 2 chooses a
2
< λ < a, NBS will yield
1 − λ < 1 − a
2
. By choosing a 6 λ < 1, Player 2 will get 1 − λ, and 0 by
choosing λ = 1. Thus, λ∗ = a
2
, yielding a solution
(
a
2
, 1− a
2
)
After stating our result for the case where Player 2 makes pre-donation, we
will now check whether Player 1 can benefit from unilateral predonation of
himself. Now, we have the following bargaining set if λ 6= 1
Now, it is trivially true that λ∗ 6= 1. We know that Nash Bargaining
solution will be a Pareto Optimal point.Thus, Nash Bargaining solution is
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the point where u1u2 is maximized on the line on the right.Thus, we will
solve the following problem on the pareto optimal line:
max u1u2
= max -u21(
1− λa
(1− λ)a) + u1
Now, ∂(u1u2)
∂u1
= 1− 2u1( 1−λa(1−λ)a). Thus,
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 iff u1 < (
(1− λ)a
2(1− λa))
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 iff u1 > (
(1− λ)a
2(1− λa))
Now, (1−λ)a
2(1−λa) > (1−λ)a iff λ > 12a . Thus, if a < 12 , we have (1−λ)a2(1−λa) < (1−λ)a
and thus Nash Bargaining solution yields either ( (1−λ)a
2(1−λa)) to Player 1 which
is decreasing in λ. Thus, λ∗ = 0. If, on the other hand, 1 > a > 1
2
, choosing
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
2a
, Nash Bargaining solution yields ( (1−λ)a
2(1−λa)) to Player 1 which is
decreasing in λ and by choosing λ > 1
2a
, Player 1 gets (1−λ)a. Thus, λ∗ = 0.
A.2 Best Responses
At this point, we will find the best responses of bargainers to the predonation
of other bargainer.
Firstly, let’s find the best response of Player 1 to a given predonation share
λ2 of Player 2. Now, when 0 < λ2 < a. we have the following bargaining set :
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The pareto optimal line is u2 =
λ1(a−λ2)−(1−λ2)
(1−λ1)(a−λ2) u1 +
a(1−λ2)
a−λ2
On the pareto optimal line:
u1u2 =
λ1(a− λ2)− (1− λ2)
(1− λ1)(a− λ2) u
2
1 +
a(1− λ2)
a− λ2 u1
Then,
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 iff
a(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
2[(1− λ2)− λ1(a− λ2)] > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 iff
a(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
2[(1− λ2)− λ1(a− λ2)] < u1
Now, if λ1 <
(1−λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a−λ2) , we have
a(1−λ2)(1−λ1)
2[(1−λ2)−λ1(a−λ2)] < (1 − λ1)λ2 and if
λ1 >
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) , we have
a(1−λ2)(1−λ1)
2[(1−λ2)−λ1(a−λ2)] > (1 − λ1)a. Furthermore, note that
(1−λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a−λ2) <
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) since λ2 < a.
Consider the case where λ2 >
a
2
: In that case Player 1 by choosing
0 6 λ1 <
(1−λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a−λ2) Player 1 will get (1 − λ1)λ2, decreasing in λ1.Thus,
if
(1−λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a−λ2) > 1, λ
∗
1 = 0. Suppose not. If
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) < 1, by choosing
(1−λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a−λ2) 6 λ1 <
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) < 1, will get
a(1−λ2)(1−λ1)
2[(1−λ2)−λ1(a−λ2)] ,decreasing in λ1.
By choosing 1−λ2
2(a−λ2) 6 λ1 6 1, will get (1 − λ1)a. If, on the other hand,
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) > 1, by choosing
(1−λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a−λ2) 6 λ1 6 1, he will get (1 − λ1)a. Thus,
combining all the cases, λ∗1 = 0 if a > λ2 >
a
2
.
Secondly, consider the case where λ2 6 a2 . In that case, we have
(1− λ2)(2− aλ2 )
2(a− λ2) 6 0.
Then, If 1−λ2
2(a−λ2) < 1, by choosing 0 6 λ1 <
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) < 1, will get
a(1−λ2)(1−λ1)
2[(1−λ2)−λ1(a−λ2)] ,decreasing in λ1. By choosing
1−λ2
2(a−λ2) 6 λ1 6 1, wii get
(1− λ1)a. If, on the other hand, 1−λ22(a−λ2) > 1, by choosing 0 6 λ1 6 1, he will
get (1− λ1)a. Thus, combining all the cases, λ∗1 = 0 if λ2 6 a2 . Thus, we have
λ∗1 = 0 ∀ λ2 ∈ [0, a)
If λ2 = a, it is trivially true that λ
∗
1 = 0.
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If 1 > λ2 > a, then Player 1 will get (1− λ1)λ2, thus λ∗1 = 0.
Thus, we have
λ∗1 = 0 ∀ λ2 ∈ [0, 1]
Let’s now find the best response of Player 2 to a given λ1. When λ1 6= 1
and λ2 <
a(1−λ1)
(1−aλ1) :(Note that when λ2 >
a(1−λ1)
(1−aλ1) we have unique pareto optimal
point.)
On the pareto optimal line:
u1u2 =
1− λ2
a(1− λ1) + aλ1λ2 − λ2 ((aλ1 − 1)u
2
1 + a(1− λ1)u1)
Thus, we have
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 iff
a(1− λ1)
2(1− aλ1) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 iff
a(1− λ1)
2(1− aλ1) < u1
Now,
a(1− λ1)
2(1− aλ1) > (1− λ1)a+ λ1λ2a iff λ2 <
a(1− λ1)(2aλ1 − 1)
2aλ1(1− aλ1)
Note that if 2aλ1−1 ≤ 0, i.e. λ1 ≤ 12a we have a(1−λ1)2(1−aλ1) ≤ (1−λ1)a+λ1λ2a.
In that case: By choosing 0 6 λ2 6 a(1−λ1)2(1−aλ1) , will get
a
2
. (1−λ1)(1−λ2)
a(1−λ1)+λ2(aλ1−1) ,
increasing in λ2. By choosing
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) < λ2 <
a(1−λ1)
(1−aλ1) , she will get 1− λ2. By
choosing a(1−λ1)
(1−aλ1) 6 λ2 < 1, will get 1− λ2.
32
If
′
λ1 >
1
2a
, choosing 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ a(1−λ1)(2aλ1−1)2aλ1(1−aλ1) Player 2 gets (1 − λ2)λ1a
which is decreasing in λ2, choosing By choosing
a(1−λ1)(2aλ1−1)
2aλ1(1−aλ1) < λ2 ≤
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) ,
she will get a
2
. (1−λ1)(1−λ2)
a(1−λ1)+λ2(aλ1−1) . By choosing
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) 6 λ2 < 1, will get 1−λ2.
Thus, we should check λ2 = 0 and λ2 =
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) . Simple calculation shows
that λ∗2 =
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) .
Thus, we have
λ∗2 =
a(1− λ1)
2(1− aλ1) ∀λ1 ∈ [0, 1)
When λ1 = 1, it is trivial that λ
∗
2 = 0 =
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) .
A.3 Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria
Firstly, let’s check the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game where Player 1 is
the leader. In that case, Player 1, knowing the best response of player 2, will
announce λ1 and then Player 2 will announce λ2. Now,
u1u2 =
2− a− aλ1
a(1− λ1)(1− aλ1) [2(aλ1 − 1)u1 + a(1− λ1)]
,hence u1u2 is maximized at point (
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) ,1 −
a(1−λ1)
2(1−aλ1) ). Thus, λ
∗
1 = 0.
Then, λ∗2 =
a
2
, yielding a solution (a
2
, 1− a
2
).
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATIONS IN CHAPTER 4
Now, as we stated before we can transform the bargaining set such that ideal
point of Player 2 is 1 and ideal point of Player 1 is a and the disagreement
point is the origin since Nash Bargaining solution satisfies IAT and IIA. We
will look at each case seperately. First case:
Now, fN(S, d) = (a
2
, 1
2
)
This is the so called simple bargaining problem. We investigated this case
in previous chapter when 0 < a < 1. Let’s look at the case when a = 1 :
When a = 1, Player 2 gets 1
2
if she chooses λ ≤ 1
2
. If she chooses λ > 1
2
,
she gets 1 − λ.Thus, she can get 1
2
at most, thus she can not gain from
predonation.Let’ s find responses of each player:Firstly, let’s find the best
response of Player 2 to a given λ1 : Now, if λ1 >
1
2
: Player 2 gets λ1 by
34
choosing 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1 − λ1. If player 2 chooses λ2 bigger than 1-λ1, Player 2
gets 1
2
if λ2 > 12 and 1 − λ2 if λ2 < 12 . If λ1 = 12 , player 2 gets 12 . If λ1 < 12 ,
Player 2 gets 1
2
by choosing 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 12 < 1−λ1. By choosing 12 < λ2 ≤ 1−λ1,
player 2 gets 1− λ2 and choosing 12 < 1− λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, gets λ1. Thus,
BR2(λ1) = [0, 1− λ1] if λ1 > 1
2
= [0, 1] if λ1 =
1
2
= [0,
1
2
] if λ1 <
1
2
Similarly,
BR1(λ2) = [0, 1− λ2] if λ2 > 1
2
= [0, 1] if λ2 =
1
2
= [0,
1
2
] if λ2 <
1
2
Let’s find Stackelberg equilibrium where player 1 is the leader. If Player 1
chooses 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 12 , Player 2 will choose λ2 ∈ [0, 12 ], yielding (12 , 12), if chooses
λ1 ≤ 12 , player 2 will choose λ2 ∈ [0, 1] yielding (12 , 12),if chooses λ1 > 12 ,
player 2 will choose λ2 ∈ [0, 1−λ1], player 1 will get 1−λ1. Thus, Stackelberg
equlibria where player 1 is the leader will yield (1
2
, 1
2
). Similarly, Stackelberg
equlibria where player 2 is the leader will yield (1
2
, 1
2
). Furthermore, it is easy
to see that all Nash equilibria yield (1
2
, 1
2
).
Let’s look at the case where a > 1. In that case, if Player 2 makes predo-
nation:
Now, note that if a
2
< λb, then NBS will yield (λb, (1− λ)b).
If a > 2b, we have a
2
> λb for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. In that case, fN(S, d) =
(a
2
, (1−λ)b
1−λb .
a
2
) whose second component is decreasing in λ.
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If a < 2b, choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ a
2b
,NBS will yield (a
2
, (1−λ)b
1−λb .
a
2
) and by choosing
a
2b
≤ λ ≤ 1, NBS will yield (λb, (1− λ)b). Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If Player 1 makes predonation: By choosing choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b
2a
,NBS will
yield ( (1−λ)ab
2(b−λa) ,
b
2
) whose first component is increasing since b < a. Choosing
b
2a
≤ λ ≤ 1, NBS will yield a(1 − λ) to Player 1. Thus, Player 1 becomes
better off in that case by choosing λ = b
2a
.
Easy calculations show that Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria yield the
same payoff pair as the payoff paie we get when Player 1 chooses his optimal
λ.
To sum up, in this case the stronger player(i.e. player with higher ideal
point) becomes strictly better off by predonating. If the ideal points of players
are same then they get at most what they get when they do not predonate.
Next case:
fN(S, d) = (b, 1) if b > a
2
fN(S, d) = (a
2
, a
2(a−b)) if b ≤ a2
If Player 2 makes predonation, we have the following bargaining set when
0 < λ < a− b :
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Thus, on the pareto optimal line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
a
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
a
2
< u1
Firstly assume that a− b > 1.Then, λ > a− b, hence there is a unique pareto
optimal point (b+ λ, 1− λ). Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If a− b < 1: if b+ λ > a
2
, i.e. λ > a
2
− b, fN(S, d) = (b+ λ, 1− λ). Thus,
if a
2
≤ b, then λ∗ = 0. Assume a
2
> b. If λ ≤ a
2
− b, fN(S, d) = (a
2
, 1−λ
(a−b)−λ .
a
2
)
whose second component is increasing in λ when a− b > λ.Thus,
if
a
2
> b and a− b < 1, then λ∗ = a
2
− b, yielding fN(S, d) = (a
2
, 1− (a
2
− b))
Note that if a − b = 1, Player 2, by predonating, gets at most what she got
before predonation.
To sum up, Player 2 becomes better off via predonation if
a
2
> b and a− b < 1.
If player 1 makes predonation, we have the following bargaining set:
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On the pareto optimal line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
a(1− λ)
2(1− λ(a− b)) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
a(1− λ)
2(1− λ(a− b)) < u1
Now, if b(1 − λ) = a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) , f
N(S, d) = (b(1 − λ), 1 + bλ) and if b(1 −
λ) < a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) , Nash Bargaining solution yields
a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) to player 1 which
is decreasing in λ. Furthermore, a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) ≤ a(1 − λ) iff λ ≤ 12(a−b) and
a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) < b(1− λ) if λ < 2b−a2b(a−b) .
Now, if a > 2b : If 1 > 2(a−b) we have b(1−λ) < a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) ≤ a(1−λ). In
that case fN(S, d) = ( a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) ,
a
2(a−b)) whose first componenent is increasing
in λ if (a− b) > 1 and Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If 1 < 2(a − b), choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
2(a−b) , f
N(S, d) = ( a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) ,
a
2(a−b))
, and choosing λ > 1
2(a−b) , f
N(S, d) = (a(1 − λ), aλ). Thus, if (a − b) > 1,
Player 1 becomes better off.
Secondly, consider the case where a ≤ 2b. If 2b−a
2b(a−b) > 1, fN(S, d) =
(b(1−λ), 1+bλ). Thus, λ∗ = 0. Assume that 2b−a
2b(a−b) < 1 ≤ 12(a−b) . By choosing
2b−a
2b(a−b) < λ ≤ 1, NBS yields a(1−λ)2(1−λ(a−b)) to Player 1, which is decreasing in λ
since 1
2
> (a− b). If 2b−a
2b(a−b) <
1
2(a−b) ≤ 1, choosing 2b−a2b(a−b) < λ ≤ 12(a−b) , NBS
yields a(1−λ)
2(1−λ(a−b)) to player 1. Choosing
1
2(a−b) ≤ λ ≤ 1, Player 1 gets a(1−λ).
Thus, if (a − b) ≤ 1, λ∗ = 0 and when (a − b) > 1 , we should check λ = 0
and λ = 1
2(a−b) . Simple calculations show that λ
∗ = 0.
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To sum up, Player 1 becomes better off if
a > 2b and (a− b) > 1
Now, let’ s find the best responses of players. By calculations we get,
BR1(λ2) =
1− λ2
2((a− b)− λ2) if a > 2b
= 0 otherwise
and
BR2(λ1) =
a(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
2[(a− b)(1− λ1) + λ2((a− b)λ1 − 1)] if
a
2
− b > 0, a− b < 1
= 0 otherwise
Thus, by similar calculations as above case all Stackelberg equilibria and
Nash equilibria yield the same result where Player 2 chooses her optimal
predonation share when a
2
− b > 0, a − b < 1 and yield the same result as
Player 1 chooses his optimal predonation when a > 2b and (a− b) > 1. Next
case:
Now, if b > 2a, then fN(S, d) = (a, b−a
b
). If b 6 2a, fN(S, d) = ( b
2
, 1
2
).
If player 2 predonates:We will consider this case in two cases:
If b < 1 : Then, if λ < b, we have the following bargaining set:
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If λ > b, then there is a unique pareto optimal point (λ, 1− λ). If b > 2a,
b
2
> a+ λ(b−a)
b
iff b(b−2a)
2(b−a) > λ.
Choosing 0 6 λ < b(b−2a)
2(b−a) , Nash Bargaining solution (NBS) yields
(1 − λ) b−a
a
; choosing b(b−2a)
2(b−a) ≤ λ ≤ b2 , fN(S, d) = ( b2 , 1−λb−λ . b2) whose second
component is increasing in λ. Choosing b
2
≤ λ ≤ 1, fN(S, d) = (λ, 1 − λ).
Thus, we should check λ = 0 and λ = b
2
. Simple calculations show that λ∗ = b
2
if a
b
> b
2
.
If b ≤ 2a, λ∗ = b
2
.
Now, we will consider the case b > 1 :
If b > 2a, b
2
> a+ λ(b−a)
b
iff b(b−2a)
2(b−a) > λ. Now, if 1 ≤ b < 2, b(b−2a)2(b−a) ≤ 1. Then,
by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b(b−2a)
2(b−a) , NBS yields (1 − λ) b−aa to Player 2. Choosing
b(b−2a)
2(b−a) ≤ λ ≤ b2 , NBS yields b2 .1−λb−λ which is decreasing in λ since b > 1. Thus,
λ∗ = 0.
If b > 2, if b(b−2a)
2(b−a) ≤ 1, we have the above case. If not, then NBS yields
(1− λ) b−a
a
to player 2. Hence, λ∗ = 0.
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To sum up, Player 2 becomes better off via predonation if (b < 1, b >
2a, a
b
> b
2
) or (b < 1, b ≤ 2a).
If player 1 makes predonation, we have the following bargaining set if
b ≤ 1, or b > 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1
b
:
If b > 1, λ > 1
b
, there is a unique pareto optimal point whose first com-
ponet is a(1− λ).
Now, on the pareto optimal line
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
b(1− λ)
2(1− λb) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
b(1− λ)
2(1− λb) < u1
Now,
b(1− λ)
2(1− λb) ≤ a(1− λ) iff
2a− b
2ab
> λ
2a− b
2ab
< 1 if b ≤ 1
. Thus, if b > 2a, then b(1−λ)
2(1−λb) > a(1 − λ), thus NBS yields a(1 − λ). Thus,
λ∗ = 0.
If b ≤ 2a, by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2a−b
2ab
, NBS yields b(1−λ)
2(1−λb) , which is increasing
in λ iff b > 1. Choosing 2a−b
2ab
≤ λ ≤ 1 NBS yields a(1− λ). Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If b > 1, and b ≤ 2a, λ∗ = 2a−b
2ab
, yielding fN(S, d) = (2ab−2a+b
2b
, 1
2
).
41
Thus, Player 1 becomes better off if
b ≤ 2a and b > 1
Now, let’ s find the best responses of players. By calculations we get,
BR1(λ2) =
b(1− λ1)
2(1− λ1b) if b ≤ 2a and b < 1
=
(1− λ1)(b− 2a+ 2abλ1)
2(1− λ1b)(aλ1 + b−ab )
if b < 1, b > 2a,
a
b
>
b
2
= 0 otherwise
and
BR2(λ1) =
b(1− λ2)(1− λ1)
2[(1− λ2 + λ2λ1)− λ1b)] if b ≤ 2a and b > 1
= 0 otherwise
Thus, by similar calculations as above case all Stackelberg equilibria and
Nash equilibria yield the same result where Player 2 chooses her optimal
predonation share when (b ≤ 2a and b < 1) or (b < 1, b > 2a, a
b
> b
2
)and yield
the same result as Player 1 chooses his optimal predonation when b ≤ 2a and
b > 1.
Another case:
42
Now, calculations show that
fN(S, d) = (
a
2
,
b
2
) if 2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a
= (
(b− 1)ac
bc− a ,
b(c− a)
bc− a ) if 2a ≤ c, c(2− b) < a
= (
c
2
,
1
2
) if 2a > c, b > a
2a− c
= (
a
2
,
b
2
) if 2a > c, b <
a
2a− c, c(2− b) > a
= (
(b− 1)ac
bc− a ,
b(c− a)
bc− a )if 2a > c, b <
a
2a− c, c(2− b) < a
Let’s check whether Player 2 can make better off by predonation.
Now, the upper line transforms to u2 = (
1−λ
c−λ )(c− u1). Thus, on this line
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
c
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
c
2
< u1
The lower line trasnforms to u2 =
b(1−λ)
a−λb (a− u1). Thus,
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
a
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
a
2
< u1
43
Some facts before we continue:
c
2
≤ (b− 1)ac+ λb(c− a)
bc− a iff λ >
c
2b(c− a)(bc+ a(1− 2b))
a
2
≤ (b− 1)ac+ λb(c− a)
bc− a iff λ >
a
2b(c− a)((2− b)c− a)
We will continue case by case:
If 2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a : In that case, we have:
0 ≤ a
2b(c− a)((2− b)c− a) <
a
b
≤ c
2b(c− a)(bc+ a(1− 2b)) <
c
2
Consider firstly the case where a < b: By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ a
2b(c−a)((2 −
b)c − a) < a
b
, fN(S, d) = (a
2
, b(1−λ)
a−λb .
a
2
) whose second component is increasing
in λ. By choosing a
2b(c−a)((2 − b)c − a) ≤ λ ≤ c2b(c−a)(bc + a(1 − 2b)), NBS
yields (1− λ) b(c−a)
bc−a . If
c
2b(c−a)(bc+ a(1− 2b)) > 1, then we are done. consider
the case c
2b(c−a)(bc + a(1 − 2b)) < 1 : If c2b(c−a)(bc + a(1 − 2b)) ≤ 1 < c2 , by
choosing c
2b(c−a)(bc + a(1 − 2b)) ≤ λ ≤ 1, NBS yields (1 − λ) to Player 2. If
c
2
< 1, then by choosing c
2b(c−a)(bc+a(1−2b)) ≤ λ ≤ c2 , fN(S, d) = ( c2 , 1−λc−λ . c2)
whose second component is increasing in λ if c < 1. Thus, if c > 1, λ∗ =
a
2b(c−a)((2 − b)c − a), yielding a payoff a2 to Player 1. If c ≤ 1, one needs to
check λ∗ = a
2b(c−a)((2− b)c− a) and λ∗ = c2 . Note that in both cases Player 1
gets at least his previous(without predonation) payoff. Thus, player 2 makes
better off in that case. If a = b, choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ a
2b(c−a)((2 − b)c − a),
fN(S, d) = (a
2
, a
2
). Thus, no gaim from predonation. If b < a, choosing
0 ≤ λ ≤ a
2b(c−a)((2−b)c−a) NBS yields b(1−λ)a−λb .a2 to Player 2 which is decreasing
since b < a. Choosing a
2b(c−a)((2− b)c− a) ≤ λ ≤ 1, Player 2 gets a(1− λ).
Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If 2a ≤ c, c(2− b) < a : In that case, we have c
2b(c−a)(bc+ a(1− 2b)) > ab >
0 > a
2b(c−a)((2 − b)c − a). By choosing 0 ≤ λ < ab , NBS yields (1 − λ) b(c−a)bc−a
to Player 2. Thus, if a > b, λ∗ = 0. If a < b: If c < 1, by choosing
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a
b
≤ λ < c
2b(c−a)(bc + a(1 − 2b)) Player 2 gets (1 − λ) b(c−a)bc−a , by choosing
c
2b(c−a)(bc+ a(1− 2b)) ≤ λ ≤ c2 , Player 2 gets 1−λc−λ . c2 . Thus, one needs to check
λ = 0 and λ = c
2
. Easily shown that λ∗ = 0. If c > 1, λ∗ = 0 by similar
calculations.
If a > c
2
, b > a
2a−c : In that case
a
b
> 0 > c
2b(c−a)(bc + a(1 − 2b)) >
a
2b(c−a)((2 − b)c − a). Thus, a2 , c2 6 (b−1)ac+λb(c−a)bc−a . Now, if c2 < ab < 1,
by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ c
2
, fN(S, d) = ( c
2
, 1−λ
c−λ .
c
2
) whose second component is
increasing if c < 1. Choosing c
2
≤ λ ≤ 1, NBS yields 1 − λ to Player 2. If
a
b
< c
2
; by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ c
2
, fN(S, d) = ( c
2
, 1−λ
c−λ .
c
2
) whose second component
is increasing if c < 1. In remaining cases Player 2 gets 1− λ.
Thus, Player 2 becomes better off if c < 1.
If a > c
2
, b(2a − c) < a, c(2 − b) > a : This case reduces to case 1 where
2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a. That is, Player 2 makes better off if b > a.
If 2a > c, b < a
2a−c , c(2− b) < a : Similarly, this case reduces to case where
2a ≤ c, c(2− b) < a.
To sum up, Player 2 becomes better off if
(2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a, a < b)
or
(a >
c
2
, b(2a− c) < a, c(2− b) > a), b > a
or
(a >
c
2
, b > a
2a− c, c < 1)
Secondly, consider the case where Player1 predonates:
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Now, the upper line is transformed so that u2 = 1 +
cλ−1
c(1−λ)u1, thus unless
λ > 1
c
, it is downward sloped. Thus, on this line
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
c(1− λ)
2(1− cλ) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
c(1− λ)
2(1− cλ) < u1
Lower line is transformed so that u2 = b+
aλ−b
a(1−λ)u1. Thus,
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
ab(1− λ)
2(b− λa) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
ab(1− λ)
2(b− λa) < u1
Lower line is transformed so that u2 = b +
aλ−b
a(1−λ)u1. Again, let’s start with
some facts:
c(1− λ)
2(1− cλ) ≤ (1− λ)
(b− 1)ac
bc− a iff λ ≤
b(2a− c)− a
2ac(b− 1)
ab(1− λ)
2(b− λa) > (1− λ)
(b− 1)ac
bc− a iff λ >
b(a+ (b− 2)c)
2ac(b− 1)
b(2a− c)− a
2ac(b− 1) <
b(a+ (b− 2)c)
2ac(b− 1) <
b
2a
Now, if 2a ≤ c, c(2 − b) > a : In that case, c(1−λ)
2(1−cλ) > (1 − λ) (b−1)acbc−a and
ab(1−λ)
2(b−λa) > (1 − λ) (b−1)acbc−a . Consider firstly when b > a :Now, if b2a < λ, then
ab(1−λ)
2(b−λa) > (1−λ)a. In that case NBS yields (1−λ)a to Player 1, decreasing in
λ. By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b
2a
, NBS yields ab(1−λ)
2(b−λa) to player 1 which is decreasing
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in λ. Thus, if b > 2a, then λ∗ = 0. If b < 2a, by choosing b
2a
< λ < 1, NBS
yields 1 − λ to player 1, hence λ∗ = 0. If b < a, choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b
2a
, NBS
yields ab(1−λ)
2(b−λa) to player 1 which is increasing in λ in that case.
If 2a ≤ c, c(2 − b) < a : In that case, c(1−λ)
2(1−cλ) > (1 − λ) (b−1)acbc−a and
b(a+(b−2)c)
2ac(b−1) > 0. Thus, by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b(a+(b−2)c)2ac(b−1) , Player 1 gets
(1 − λ) (b−1)ac
bc−a . Hence,if
b(a+(b−2)c)
2ac(b−1) > 1, λ
∗ = 0. Suppose not. Then, assume
b
2a
< 1 : Choosing b(a+(b−2)c)
2ac(b−1) ≤ λ ≤ b2a , NBS yields ab(1−λ)2(b−λa) decreasing in
λ. Choosing b
2a
≤ λ ≤ 1, NBS yields a(1 − λ) to player 1. Thus, λ∗ = 0. If
b
2a
> 1 :Choosing b(a+(b−2)c)
2ac(b−1) ≤ λ ≤ 1, NBS yields ab(1−λ)2(b−λa) decreasing in λ.Thus,
λ∗ = 0.
If a > c
2
, b > a
2a−c : In that case, by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b(a+(b−2)c)2ac(b−1) (< 1c ),
Player 1 gets ( c
2
. 1−λ
1−cλ) which is increasing in λ iff c > 1. Thus, Player 1 makes
better off if c > 1, easily shown λ∗ = 0 if c ≤ 1.
If a > c
2
, b(2a− c) < a, c(2− b) > a : This case redeces to the case where
2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a.
If 2a > c, b < a
2a−c , c(2− b) < a : Similarly, this case reduces to case where
2a ≤ c, c(2− b) < a.
Thus, to sum up, Player 1 becomes better off if
(2a ≤ c, c(2− b) > a, a > b)
or
(a >
c
2
, b(2a− c) < a, c(2− b) > a, b < a)
or
(a >
c
2
, b > a
2a− c, c > 1)
For this case and for the remaining cases, similar to previous cases Steckelberg
and Nash equilibria yields the same solution when either player 1 or player 2
chooses optimal predonation share noting that cases when player 1 becomes
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better off and cases when player 2 becomes better off do not coincide.Next
case:
fN(S, d) = (b, 1) if b > c
2
= (
a
2
,
e
2
) if b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a
= (
c
2
,
c
2(c− b)) if b <
c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac
and fN(S, d) = (a(c−e(c−b))
a−e(c−b) ,
e(a−c)
a−e(c−b)) if b <
c
2
, (2a−c)e(c−b) > ac, e(c−b) >
2c− a
If Player 2 makes predonation:
Then the upper line transforms to u2 =
1−λ
(c−b)−λ(c−u1) which is downward
sloped if λ ≤ (c− b). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
c
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
c
2
< u1
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The lower line transforms to u2 =
(1−λ)e
a−λe (a− u1). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
a
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
a
2
< u1
Again we will state some facts before continuing:
c
2
> a(c− e(c− b)) + λe(a− c)
a− e(c− b) if λ ≤
ac+ (c− 2a)e(c− b)
2e(c− a)
a
2
> a(c− e(c− b)) + λe(a− c)
a− e(c− b) if λ ≤
a((2c− a)− e(c− b))
2e(c− a)
a((2c− a)− e(c− b))
2e(c− a) <
a
e
Again we will continue case by case:
If b > c
2
, we have b+ λ > c
2
, yielding 1− λ to player 2 ,thus λ∗ = 0.
If b < c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a: In that case if c
2
− b > 1 we have c
2
> b+ λ. In
that case, we have c−b > 1. Assume firstly that a > e. By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤
a((2c−a)−e(c−b))
2e(c−a) , NBS yields (
a
2
, a
2
. (1−λ)e
a−λe ) whose second component is increasing
in λ if e > a. Thus, if a((2c−a)−e(c−b))
2e(c−a) > 1, λ∗ = 0. Suppose
a((2c−a)−e(c−b))
2e(c−a) <
1 ≤ ac+(c−2a)e(c−b)
2e(c−a) . Choosing
a((2c−a)−e(c−b))
2e(c−a) < λ ≤ 1 ,Player 2 gets (1 −
λ) e(a−c)
a−e(c−b) ,thus λ
∗ = 0. If ac+(c−2a)e(c−b)
2e(c−a) < 1, choosing
ac+(c−2a)e(c−b)
2e(c−a) < λ ≤ 1
NBS yields ( c
2
, 1−λ
(c−b)−λ .
c
2
) whose second component is increasing if c− b < 1
Thus, if c
2
− b > 1 and a > e Player 2 can not become better off. Assume
a < e. In that case choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ a((2c−a)−e(c−b))
2e(c−a) , NBS yields (
a
2
, a
2
. (1−λ)e
a−λe )
whose second component is increasing in λ. Thus, Player 2 makes better
off. If c
2
− b < 1, then we have c
2
> b + λ if c
2
− b > λ. Thus, when
ac+(c−2a)e(c−b)
2e(c−a) ≤ ( c2 − b),that is when a ≤ e(a− b) and a < e Player 2 becomes
better off. Thus, Player 2 becomes better off if
c
2
− b > 1 and a < e
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or
c
2
− b < 1 and a < e and a ≤ e(a− b)
If b < c
2
, (2a−c)e(c−b) > ac, we have c
2
< a(c−e(c−b))+λe(a−c)
a−e(c−b) : If
c
2
−b > λ,
fN(S, d) = ( c
2
, c
2
. (1−λ)
(c−b)−λ) whose second component is increasing if (c− b) < 1.
If c
2
− b < λ, NBS yields 1 − λ to player 2. Thus, if c − b > 1, λ∗ = 0. If
c− b < 1, by choosing λ = c
2
− b, player 2 makes better off if c− b < 1.
If b < c
2
, (2a − c)e(c − b) > ac, e(c − b) > 2c − a, we have a
2
<
a(c−e(c−b))+λe(a−c)
a−e(c−b) . By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ ac+(c−2a)e(c−b)2e(c−a) , NBS yields (1 −
λ) e(a−c)
a−e(c−b) to player 2, hence λ
∗ = 0.
Thus,Player 2 becomes better off if
(b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a, c
2
− b > 1 and a < e)
or
(b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a, c
2
− b < 1 and a < e and a ≤ e(a− b))
or
(b <
c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac, c− b < 1)
Now, check whether Player 1 becomes better off:
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Then the upper line transforms to u2 =
c
c−b +
λ(c−b)−1
(c−b)(1−λ)u1. On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
(1− λ)c
2(1− λ(c− b)) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
(1− λ)c
2(1− λ(c− b)) < u1
The lower line transforms to u2 = e+
(λa−e)
a(1−λ)u1. On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
ae(1− λ)
2(e− λa) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
ae(1− λ)
2(e− λa) < u1
Again, we will consider each case seperately:
If b > c
2
, Player 1 gets b(1− λ).Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If b < c
2
, e(c−b) < 2c−a: In that case we have ae(1−λ)
2(e−λa) > (1−λ)a(c−e(c−b))a−e(c−b) .
If λ < e
2a
, we have ae(1−λ)
2(e−λa) < a(1−λ). Thus when e > 2a, ae(1−λ)2(e−λa) < a(1−λ).In
that case NBS yields ae(1−λ)
2(e−λa) to player 1 which is increasing if a < e. Thus,
Player 1 cannot become better off. On the other hand, if a > e, Player 1 can
become better off by choosing λ = e
2a
.
Thus, Player 1 becomes better off if
b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a,a > e
If b < c
2
, (2a−c)e(c−b) > ac, we have b(1−λ) < (1−λ)c
2(1−λ(c−b)) . Choosing 0 ≤
λ ≤ e(c−b)(2a−c)−ac
2a(c−b)(e(c−b)−c) , Player 1 gets
c(1−λ)
2(1−λ(c−b)) which is increasing if (c− b) > 1.
Thus, Player 1 becomes better off if
b <
c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac, (c− b) > 1
If b < c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac, e(c− b) > 2c− a, again NBS yields ae
2
. 1−λ
e−λa
to player 1 decreasing in λ.
Thus, λ∗ = 0.
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Thus, Player 1 becomes better off if
b <
c
2
, e(c− b) < 2c− a,a > e
or
b <
c
2
, (2a− c)e(c− b) > ac, (c− b) > 1
Next case:
In that case,
fN(S, d) = (a,
d
b
.(b− a)) if b
2
> a
= (
b
2
,
d
2
) if
b
2
< a, (2− d)c > b
= (
bc(d− 1)
cd− b ,
d(c− b)
cd− b ) if
b
2
< a, (2− d)c < b, b > (2b− c)d
= (
c
2
,
1
2
) if
b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d
If Player 2 makes predonation,Then the upper line transforms to u2 =
1−λ
c−λ (c− u1). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
c
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
c
2
< u1
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The lower line transforms to u2 =
d(1−λ)
b−λd (b− u1). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
b
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
b
2
< u1
Now,some facts:
c
2
≤ bc(d− 1) + λd(c− b)
cd− b iff λ >
c(b− d(2b− c))
2d(c− b)
b
2
≤ bc(d− 1) + λd(c− b)
cd− b iff λ >
b(c(2− d)− b)
2d(c− b)
b
2
> a+ λd
b
(b− a) iff b(b− 2a)
2d(b− a) > λ
If b
2
> a : If b(b−2a)
2d(b−a) > 1, then Player 2 gets (1− λ)db (b− a). Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If b(c(2−d)−b)
2d(c−b) ≤ b(b−2a)2d(b−a) , by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ b(c(2−d)−b)2d(c−b) , Player 2 gets d(1−λ)b−λd b2
,increasing if d > b. In that case, we should check λ = 0 and λ = b(c(2−d)−b)
2d(c−b) .
Calculations show that λ∗ = 0. Easy to see in other cases λ∗ = 0.
If b
2
< a, (2 − d)c > b, we have b
2
< a + λd
b
(b − a). By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤
b(c(2−d)−b)
2d(c−b) (<
b
d
), Player 2 gets d(1−λ)
b−λd
b
2
,increasing if d > b.
If b
2
< a, (2 − d)c < b, b > (2b − c)d : In that case, b
2
> bc(d−1)+λd(c−b)
cd−b
.Now, if b(c(2−d)−b)
2d(c−b) > 1, NBS yields (1 − λ)d(c−b)cd−b . If b(c(2−d)−b)2d(c−b) < 1, if c2 < 1,
by choosing b(c(2−d)−b)
2d(c−b) < λ ≤ c2 , Player 2 gets 1−λc−λ . c2 increasing in λ if c < 1..
Choosing c
2
≤ λ ≤ 1 player 2 gets 1 − λ. Thus, we should check λ = 0 and
λ = c
2
. Calculations yield λ∗ = 0. If c
2
> 1, choosing b(c(2−d)−b)
2d(c−b) < λ ≤ c2 ,
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Player 2 gets 1−λ
c−λ .
c
2
decreasing in λ. Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d, we have c
2
≤ bc(d−1)+λd(c−b)
cd−b . If
c
2
< 1, by choosing
0 ≤ λ ≤ c
2
, player 2 gets 1−λ
c−λ .
c
2
increasing in λ if c < 1. If c
2
> 1, choosing
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 < c
2
Player 2 gets 1−λ
c−λ .
c
2
decreasing in λ.
Thus, Player 2 becomes better off if [ b
2
< a, (2 − d)c > b, d > b], or
[ b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d, c < 1]
Now, let’s check whether player 1 can become better off via predonation.
the upper line transforms to u2 = 1 +
λc−1
c(1−λ)u1. On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
c(1− λ)
2(1− λc) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
c(1− λ)
2(1− λc) < u1
The lower line transforms to u2 = d+
λb−d
b(1−λ)u1. On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
db(1− λ)
2(d− λb) > u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
db(1− λ)
2(d− λb) < u1
Now,some facts:
c(1− λ)
2(1− λc) > (1− λ)
bc(d− 1)
cd− b iff λ >
−b+ d(2b− c)
2bc(d− 1)
db(1− λ)
2(d− λb) > (1− λ)
bc(d− 1)
cd− b iff λ >
d(c(d− 2) + b)
2bc(d− 1)
db(1− λ)
2(d− λb) > a(1− λ) iff
d(2a− b)
2ab
≤ λ
54
If b
2
> a : In that case db(1−λ)
2(d−λb) > a(1 − λ). Thus, yielding a(1 − λ) ,hence
λ∗ = 0.
If b
2
< a, (2 − d)c > b, we have db(1−λ)
2(d−λb) > (1 − λ) bc(d−1)cd−b and c(1−λ)2(1−λc) >
(1−λ) bc(d−1)
cd−b . If c < 1, we have
1
c
> 1 thus d
b
> 1. By choosing 0 ≤ λ < d(2a−b)
2ab
,
NBS yields db(1−λ)
2(d−λb) to player 1 which is increasing if b > d. If λ >
d(2a−b)
2ab
,
Player 1 gets a(1 − λ). Thus, if d > b Player 1 can not become better off.
If,on the other hand, d < b, Player 1 becomes better off.
Thus, Player 1 becomes better off if b > d.
If b
2
< a, (2− d)c < b, b > (2b− c)d : In that case, c(1−λ)
2(1−λc) > (1− λ) bc(d−1)cd−b .
By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ d(c(d−2)+b)
2bc(d−1) player 1 gets (1−λ) bc(d−1)2bc(d−1) . If d(c(d−2)+b)2bc(d−1) > 1,
then we are done. If d(c(d−2)+b)
2bc(d−1) < 1 : Choosing
d(c(d−2)+b)
2bc(d−1) ≤ λ ≤ d(2a−b)2ab , player
1 gets db(1−λ)
2
. Thus, λ∗ = 0.
If b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d, choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ −b+d(2b−c)
2bc(d−1) NBS yields
c(1−λ)
2(1−λc) to
player 1. Thus, if c > 1 Player 1 can become better off. Easy to verify when
c ≤ 1, Player 1 can not become better off.
Thus, Player 1 becomes better off if
b
2
< a, (2− d)c > b, b > d
or
b
2
< a, b < (2b− c)d, c > 1
Final case:
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In that case, if 2c ≤ e, fN(S, d)
= (
(b− 1)ec
eb− c ,
b(e− c)
eb− c ) if e(2− b) < c, b(2c− a) < cd
= (
a
2
,
d
2
) if b(2c− a) > cd
= (
c
2
,
b
2
) if b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c)
= (
(d− b)ac
cd− ab ,
bd(c− a)
cd− ab ) if b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab > d(2a− c)
If 2c > e :
= (
1
2
,
e
2
) if (2c− e)b > c
= (
(b− 1)ec
eb− c ,
b(e− c)
eb− c )if(2c− e)b < c, e(2− b) < c, b(2c− a) < cd
= (
a
2
,
d
2
) if (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) > cd
= (
c
2
,
b
2
)if (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c)
and
= (
(d− b)ac
cd− ab ,
bd(c− a)
cd− ab )if (2c−e)b < c, b(2c−a) < cd, e(2−b) > c, ab > d(2a−c)
If Player 2 makes predonation,Then the upper line transforms to u2 =
1−λ
e−λ(e− u1). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
e
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
e
2
< u1
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The middle line transforms to u2 =
b(1−λ)
c−λb (c− u1). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
c
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
c
2
< u1
The lower line transforms to u2 =
d(1−λ)
a−λd (a− u1). On this line:
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
> 0 if
a
2
> u1
∂(u1u2)
∂u1
< 0 if
a
2
< u1
Now,some facts:
e
2
> (b− 1)ec+ λb(e− c)
be− c iff λ ≤
e(b(e− 2c) + c)
2b(e− c)
c
2
> (b− 1)ec+ λb(e− c)
be− c iff λ ≤
c(e(2− b)− c)
2b(e− c)
c
2
>
(d− b)ac+ λbd(c− a)
cd− ab iff
c(d(1− 2a) + ab)
2bd(c− a) > λ
a
2
<
(d− b)ac+ λbd(c− a)
cd− ab iff
a(b(2c− a)− cd)
2bd(c− a) < λ
If 2c ≤ e, e(2 − b) < c, b(2c − a) < cd, we have a
2
< (d−b)ac+λbd(c−a)
cd−ab ,
c
2
≤ (b−1)ec+λb(e−c)
be−c . In that case if e ∈ [λ, (b−1)ec+λb(e−c)be−c ], fN(S, d) = ( e2 , e2 1−λe−λ).
If e
2
< λ, fN(S, d) = (λ, 1−λ). If e
2
> (b−1)ec+λb(e−c)
be−c , NBS yields (1−λ) b(e−c)be−c .
Now, e ∈ [λ, (b−1)ec+λb(e−c)
be−c ] iff
e
2
> λ > e(b(e−2c)+c)
2b(e−c) > 0. If
e(b(e−2c)+c)
2b(e−c) > 1, we
have λ∗ = 0. If e
2
> 1 > e(b(e−2c)+c)
2b(e−c) , by choosing
e(b(e−2c)+c)
2b(e−c) < λ < 1, Player
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2 will get e
2
1−λ
e−λ . If 1 >
e
2
, if e < 1, then λ∗ = e
2
or λ∗ = 0. Calculations show
that λ∗ = 0.
If 2c ≤ e, b(2c − a) > cd : if e(2 − b) ≤ c, c
2
≤ (b−1)ec+λb(e−c)
be−c . In that case
this reduces to case 1. Thus, λ∗ = 0. If e(2 − b) > c, by choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤
a(b(2c−a)−cd)
2bd(c−a) , NBS yields (
a
2
.d(1−λ)
a−λd ), increasing in λ if a < d. Thus, player 2
makes better off if 2c ≤ e, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a < d.
If 2c ≤ e, b(2c − a) < cd, e(2 − b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a − c), we have
a
2
< (d−b)ac+λbd(c−a)
cd−ab . By choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ c(e(2−b)−c)2b(e−c) , player 2 gets b(1−λ)c−λb . c2
increasing in λ if b > c. Thus,player 2 becomes better off.
If 2c ≤ e, b(2c − a) < cd, e(2 − b) > c, ab > d(2a − c), we have to check
λ = 0 and λ = c(e(2−b)−c)
2b(e−c) . Calculations yield λ
∗ = 0.
If 2c > e, (2c − e)b > c, we have e
2
≤ (b−1)ec+λb(e−c)
be−c . If
e
2
< λ, NBS
yields (1 − λ), if e
2
> λ, fN(S, d) = ( e
2
, e
2
.1−λ
e−λ). If e > 1, we have λ∗ = 0. If
e < 1, we should check λ = 0 and λ = e
2
. Then, we have λ∗ = e
2
. Thus, if
2c > e, (2c− e)b > c, e < 1, Player 2 becomes better off.
The remaining cases reduce to the first four case.Thus, Player 2 becomes
better off via predonation if
[2c ≤ e, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a < d] or
[2c ≤ e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c), b > c] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b > c, e < 1] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a < d] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c), b > c]
By similar calculations player 1 becomes better off via predonation if
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[2c ≤ e, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a > d] or
[2c ≤ e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c), b < c] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) > cd, e(2− b) > c, a > d] or
[2c > e, (2c− e)b < c, b(2c− a) < cd, e(2− b) > c, ab ≤ d(2a− c), b < c]
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